A Political Disconnect?
Evidence From Voting on EU Trade Agreements*

Paola Conconi

Oxford University, CEPR, CESifo, and CEP

Florin Cucu

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES)

Federico Gallina

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES)

Mattia Nardotto

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES) and CEPR

April 2024

Click here for the most recent version

Abstract

It has been argued that public engagement in democracies has declined in the last decades due to a growing disconnect between citizens and their representatives. The European Union is a case in point, if not the most prominent example of an institution seen as suffering from a "democratic deficit". Even the directly elected members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are often accused of being disconnected from the interests of European citizens. However, little is actually known about whether European legislators respond to their voters' interests when making critical policy choices. We address this question by studying the determinants of MEPs' votes on the approval of EU trade agreements. Against widespread Eurosceptic arguments, we find that these votes reflect the trade policy interests of MEPs' constituencies. The results are robust to controlling for a rich set of variables and fixed effects to account for potential confounding factors, and using different sets of votes and econometric methodologies. An instrumental variable approach supports a causal interpretation of our findings.

JEL Classifications: F13, D72.

Keywords: EU Democratic Deficit, European Parliament, Roll-call Votes, Trade Agreements.

*We wish to thank for their helpful comments Toke Aidt, Italo Colantone, Peter Egger, Ekkehard Köhler, Georg Kirchsteiger, Lars Nilsson, Gianluca Orefice, André Sapir, and participants and the Silvaplana Political Economy Workshop and at seminars at ECARES, Paris Dauphine, Southampton University, Nottingham University, the Bank of Italy, Bologna University, and the Paris Trade Seminar. Paola Conconi gratefully acknowledges funding from the European Research Council (Advanced ERC Grant No. 834253). Correspondence should be addressed to Paola Conconi, paola.conconi@economics.ox.ac.uk.

1 Introduction

It has been argued that public engagement in democracies has declined in the last decades due to a growing disconnect between citizens and their representatives (e.g., Flinders, 2015; Foa *et al.*, 2016; Fisher, 2018). The European Union (EU) and its institutions have been the target of such criticism, with the EU being accused of suffering from a "democratic deficit." Even the members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who are directly elected by the EU citizens, are portrayed as unaccountable bureaucrats who do not represent the interests of their electorate.[1] These arguments have played a key role in the Brexit campaign,[2] and are commonly summoned by populist politicians who uphold a denigratory vision of elites in Europe and elsewhere and depict them as corrupt and distant from the wishes of the people (e.g., Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022; Bellodi *et al.*, 2023). They are also common among scholars, who emphasize the disconnect between voter preferences and EP decision-making due to the second-order nature of European elections (Hobolt and Franklin, 2011).[3]

While Eurosceptic arguments are widespread, there is surprisingly little evidence on whether European legislators are responsive to their voters' interests when making key policy choices. This is the first paper addressing this question, by systematically studying the determinants of MEPs' votes on the approval of trade agreements between 2009 and 2020.

There are five reasons for focusing on trade agreements. First, the Common Commercial Policy is an exclusive competence of the EU, enshrined in Article 207 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Second, the EU is a key player in trade policy and has the largest network of trade agreements in the world, with more than 40 agreements fully in force or provisionally applied and many more being negotiated. Third, since the 2009 Lisbon

[1] For instance, see "Elected, yet strangely unaccountable" (*The Economist*, May 15, 2014). At the same time, the article points out that "the desire for more democratic accountability has meant that every successive treaty has increased the European Parliament's powers. Today it is in almost all respects a co-equal legislator with the national governments that meet in the Council of Ministers. As much as 90% of what the EU does requires the parliament's assent. And since the EU is involved in as much as half of all legislation in Europe, that makes the European Parliament more powerful than most national legislatures".

[2] "Britain's self-ejection from Europe is the culmination not just of four months of heady campaigning but four decades of latent Euroscepticism. (...) It has become a tenet of Euroscepticism that the union is too remote from the people it is governing" ("How did UK end up voting to leave the European Union?" *The Guardian*, June 24, 2016). See Figures A-1 and A-2 for coverage of the EU democratic deficit and Euroscepticism in the media and scholarly literature. See De Vries (2018) for an extensive analysis of different forms of Euroscepticism.

[3] Some have argued that European citizens have no shared interests and identity (Weiler *et al.*, 1995) and that low turnout in European elections is driven by the second-order nature of European elections, which are fought in the shadow of main (first-order) national elections. Other scholars instead point out that European citizens have much in common — sharing similar constitutional and democratic principles — and that the European Parliament features the same left-right divide that exists in all the member states (Hix, 2008).

Treaty, the entry into force of trade agreements requires the approval of MEPs.[4] Forth, there is an ample literature showing that trade shocks matter for politics (e.g., Autor *et al.*, 2020; Colantone and Stanig, 2018a,b; Che *et al.*, 2022), but little is known about whether representatives' policy choices reflect the trade interests of their constituencies.

Figure 1
Salience of trade policy

(a) Internet searches on trade agreements (Google Trends)



(b) Media coverage of trade agreements (Factiva)



(c) Coverage of Trade in Parties' Manifestos (Manifesto Project)



Notes: Panel (a) reports the volume of internet searches on trade agreements. in EU member states. This is a weighted average of the yearly Google Trends score for each member state (using population as weights). Panel (b) shows the media coverage of trade agreements in EU member states, using data from Factiva. Panel (c) plots the share of European political parties that mention trade in their electoral program, using data from the Manifesto Project.

Finally, trade agreements are increasingly salient to EU citizens, as illustrated by Figure 1. This shows that the volume of internet searches related to trade agreements (panel (a)), the media coverage of trade agreements (panel (b)), and the share of European political parties that mention trade policy in their electoral program (panel (c)) have all increased significantly

[4] "Mixed" trade agreements, which include provisions outside the EU's exclusive competencies, must also be approved by member states, following their national ratification procedures (see Conconi *et al.*, 2021).

over the sample period covered in our data.[5] The salience of EU trade agreements can be also illustrated by movements and campaigns, such as the "Stop CETA and TTIP!" organized during the negotiations of the agreements with Canada and the United States, as well as the ongoing protests against the EU-Mercosur agreement.

To study the link between the voting behavior of EU legislators sitting in the European Parliament and the interests of their constituents, we construct a new dataset of roll-call votes on the approval of the 15 trade agreements signed by the EU since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (see Figure 3 in Section 2). We combine these data with information on the trade policy interests of MEPs' constituents and other factors that might shape voting patterns in the EP. To measure the trade policy interests of a constituency, we construct its export ratio as the ratio of employment in export-oriented sectors and employment in import-competing sectors. This variable is meant to capture the extent to which voters in a constituency should gain or lose from trade agreements.[6] We also collect systematic information on other variables that can affect MEPs' voting behavior, some defined at the MEP level (e.g., party affiliation, tenure, gender, age, domestic political career), others at the constituency level (e.g., unemployment, education, ideological position, trust in political parties and EU institutions).

Our main finding is that European legislators respond to their constituents' interests when voting on trade agreements: MEPs representing constituencies with a higher share of jobs in export-oriented as compared to import-competing industries are more likely to vote in favor of a trade agreement. The results are robust to including a rich set of controls and different types of fixed effects (i.e., agreement, European political party, constituency, MEP). We also implement an instrumental variable strategy to address any remaining concerns about the endogeneity of the export-oriented/import-competing composition of the local economies (e.g., a potential correlation between employment in trade-exposed sectors and unobserved factors like cultural traits or shocks affecting constituencies). The instrument exploits data on the allocation of employment in non-EU OECD countries. The logic behind the instrument is that, while being uncorrelated with regional shocks in employment and local politics, changes in employment shares in other countries capture global shocks affecting

[5]The figure in panel (c) is constructed using information on the trade-related codes of the Manifesto Project (406 and 407). To smooth electoral cycles, we report the 5-years moving average of the share of European parties that mention trade in their program.

[6]Economists have long emphasized the gains in allocative and productive efficiency that trade integration can bring. However, an ample economic literature also points out that lowering trade barriers generates winners and losers, stressing the importance of mechanisms to compensate the latter group to avoid the "backlash of globalization" (Colantone *et al.*, 2022).

industries (e.g., technological shocks) and, thus, employment levels in these industries. The results support a causal interpretation of our findings.

In terms of magnitude, our baseline estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the export ratio raises the probability of a vote in favor of a trade agreement by 4.24 percentage points. Using these estimates, we can carry out counterfactual experiments to predict how MEPs would have voted under a different distribution of export ratios. For example, a 20% (50%) decrease in the export ratio would lead 17 (41) MEPs to switch to a negative vote on the agreement with Canada. The effects are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those found for votes on the approval of trade agreements in the US Congress using the data from Conconi *et al.* (2014). Thus EU legislators do not seem to be significantly different from US legislators in terms of their responsiveness to the trade interests of their electorate.

We discuss and rule out alternative interpretations of our findings on MEPs' votes. A large literature shows that politicians tend to favor the regions in which they are born (e.g., Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Burgess *et al.*, 2015). One may thus be concerned that our results could be driven by the interests of MEPs' birth region rather than those of their broader EU constituency. We show that, even when excluding the region in which EU legislators were born, their voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of the EU constituency they represent. We also rule out that our results are driven by lobbying pressure. There is evidence that large firms dominate lobbying on trade policy (e.g., Kim 2018; Osgood, 2017, Blanga-Gubbay *et al.*, 2023). We show that our estimates are unaffected when controlling for the presence of large firms in MEPs' constituencies.

Finally, we examine whether the trade policy interests of EU constituencies affect political support for pro-trade parties. Against the widespread idea that voters are uninterested and uninformed about European elections and EU policies, we find that more export-oriented constituencies are more likely to vote in favor of pro-trade parties in EU elections.

Our paper contributes to two main strands of the literature. The first examines whether elected representatives respond to the wishes of their electorate. This has been a central concern in normative democratic theory (e.g., Arrow 1963; Sen, 1970). Several studies examine the relationship between public opinion and policies in the United States (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson *et al.*, 1995; Lax and Philips, 2012). Some studies show that low clarity of responsibility and limited information imply that elected representatives are less responsive to public preferences (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2002; Snyder and Strömberg, 2008). Notwithstanding widespread Eurosceptic arguments, little is known about the con-

gruence between MEP's decisions and their voters' interests.[7] We are the first to study MEPs' votes on a key policy issue — the approval of trade agreements — and whether they are shaped by the interests of their electorate.

We also contribute to the literature on the political economy of trade policy. Most studies examine the role of lobbying by industries or firms (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Kim, 2017; Blanga Gubbay *et al.*, 2023; Maggi and Ossa, 2023). Few studies examine the role of electoral incentives (Conconi *et al.*, 2014) and swing-state politics (Bown *et al.*, 2023). Much of this literature focuses on the United States. Data availability has so far prevented systematic work on European trade policy.[8] We overcome this limitation by constructing a large dataset of MEPs' votes on the approval of trade agreements. As discussed in Section 2, this requires collecting information from many different sources, many of which are in the official languages of the EU member states.

2 Data and variables

2.1 Geographic areas

Our analysis uses and constructs data at several geographic levels. In what follows, we discuss the geographic aggregates used in the analysis.

NUTS regions The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a hierarchical system that divides EU member states' territory into regions for statistical purposes. The standard, first adopted by the EU in 2003, has been revised several times. In our analysis, we use the 2016 version. More information on the regional data can be found in Appendix A-1.

European constituencies The European Electoral Act of 2002 allows countries to establish sub-national constituencies for the purpose of electing MEPs. Figure 2 shows the EP constituencies in the seventh, eighth, and ninth legislatures. Notice that most member states choose to operate a single, national constituency.[9]

[7] A few studies examine votes in the EP before the Liston Treaty (e.g., Hix *et al.*, 2006; Hix and Noury, 2007). Other authors study votes in the European Council (e.g., Mattila, 2009; Hagemann *et al.*, 2016).

[8] A few recent studies examine the trade shock driven by surging imports from China on political outcomes in the European Union (e.g., Colantone and Stanig, 2018a,b).

[9] There are only six countries that, during the period we study, are divided into sub-national constituencies. Belgium has three constituencies organized by linguistic community: a Dutch-speaking electoral college, a French-speaking electoral college, and a German-speaking electoral college. The German-speaking college

Figure 2

European constituencies and NUTS-2 regions

(a) 7th legislature



(b) 8th legislature



(c) 9th legislature



Notes: This figure figure shows the constituencies in which MEPs were elected during the seventh, eight, and ninth legislatures of the EP. Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom use sub-national constituencies throughout the sample period. Until the ninth legislature, France was also divided into sub-national constituencies. With the exception of Ireland, all EP constituencies are aggregates of or overlap with NUTS-2 regions.

elects only one representative and is fully contained within the Liège Province (the corresponding NUTS-2 region is BE33). Residents of the Brussels-Capital Region can vote either for the Dutch- or the French-speaking candidate list. When constructing measures for these constituencies, we split Brussels using the vote share allocated to each list. France is divided into eight constituencies during the seventh and eighth legislatures, before becoming a national constituency in 2019. All French sub-national constituencies are aggregates of NUTS-2 regions. As Eurobarometer is not conducted in the Overseas Territories, we drop the Overseas constituency. Italy is divided into five sub-national constituencies, which are aggregates of NUTS-2 regions. Poland is divided into 13 constituencies which correspond to or are aggregates of NUTS-2 regions. Because the Eurobarometer and Eurostat (until 2016) report only aggregate data for the Masovian Voivodeship (NUTS-1 region PL9), we treat the Warsaw and Masovian constituencies as one constituency.

2.2 Roll-call votes on trade agreements

We use web automation to collect official documents that report the outcome of all roll-call votes that took place in the EP between 2009 and 2020.[10] [11] We parse the documents and extract the names of the MEPs attending the vote, how they voted (i.e., in favor, against, or abstained), and the European political party with which they were affiliated.[12]

Figure 3

Roll-call votes on the approval of EU trade agreements



Notes: The figure shows the roll-call votes on the approval of FTAs included in our sample.

Ireland is divided into two constituencies during the seventh legislature and three constituencies during the eighth and ninth legislatures. The boundaries of the constituencies change from one legislature to another, and they do not correspond to NUTS-2 regions. We construct measures at the constituency level in several steps using the same procedure as for creating fixed-border NUTS-2 regions. The United Kingdom, while a member of the European Union, was divided into 12 constituencies, all of which were aggregates of NUTS-2 regions.

[10] We use the Python library Scrapy to iterate over all webpages of the EP that include reports of roll-call votes. The scraper starts from the first sitting of the ninth legislature on July 14, 2009, and ends with the July 23, 2020 sitting of the eleventh legislature. An example of a report can be accessed here.

[11] Three trade agreements were voted by show of hands in the European Parliament during our time period: EU-Serbia and EU-Papua New Guinea/Fiji, both voted on January 19, 2011; and EU-Cameroon, voted on June 13, 2013. We can only include in our analysis agreements approved through roll-call votes, for which we have information on the voting behaviour at individual MEPs.

[12] We use the Python library Pandoc to convert the previously downloaded documents into a format compatible with the library Beautifulsoup, which we use to parse the documents and extract the necessary information.

We focus on post-Lisbon Treaty votes on the free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated by the EU. Figure 3 shows the 15 FTAs that are included in our sample. We drop from the final sample MEPs who did not vote on any trade agreement (2 MEPs), MEPs who were elected in different countries during the sample period (2 MEPs), and MEPs who represented constituencies for which we lack data on covariates (4 MEPs). The final sample comprises 9,851 votes (567 of which were abstentions) and 1,646 MEPs (32 of whom always abstained). Overall, MEPs support free trade with around 76.28% of the votes cast in our sample being in favor of the ratification of FTAs.

Figure 4

Roll-call votes on the approval of EU trade agreements
(variation within European political parties)



Notes: The figure shows the voting patterns of the European political parties included in our sample. The number next to the party name corresponds to the total number of votes cast, while the number in brackets indicates the share of votes in favor of trade agreements.

Individual MEPs tend to vote in accordance with the European political party with which they are affiliated. There is, however, deviation from the party line, as Figure 4 illustrates. There is also variation in the voting behavior of individual MEPs over time. Looking at the MEPs in our sample, 956 (294) always voted "in favor" ("against"), while 364 switchers voted both in favor and against a trade agreement during their tenure in the EP (see Figure 5). In our analysis, we will show that part of the cross-legislator and within-legislator variation

in voting behavior reflects variation in the trade policy interests of the EU constituencies represented by the MEPs.

Figure 5
Roll-call votes on the approval of EU trade agreements
(variation within MEPs)



Notes: The figure illustrates the voting behavior of individual MEPs over time. We classify as switchers MEPs who voted both in favor and against a trade agreement.

2.3 Trade Opinions

We use data from the Eurobarometer to create measures of citizens' preferences for free trade. The Eurobarometer asks whether the words "free trade" bring to mind something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative, or very negative. For each country k, we can construct the variable *Pro-Trade Opinions*$_{k,t}$ as the share of respondents for whom "free trade" conjures a very positive or fairly positive image.

The question about preferences for free trade is only asked in a select number of years during our sample period (2009 and 2014 through 2019). Figure 6 shows average support for trade among EU citizens for all years in which the data is available. This is the average of the variable *Pro-Trade Opinions*$_{k,t}$ across EU member states, weighted by population of the country. The weighted average support for free trade in the EU over the sample period is 78.63%, which is line with the share of votes cast in favor of trade agreements by MEPs (76.28%).[13]

[13]The country with the lowest support for free trade is Austria in 2016, with only 54.3% of the respondents having a positive view, while Malta in 2019 has the highest approval rate at 95.1%.

Figure 6
Pro-Trade Opinions of EU Citizens



Notes: The figure illustrates support for free trade among EU citizens during our sample period. The dot is the weighted (by population) average for the EU-28, the line in the box is the median, the sides of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the two whiskers on the side are the highest and lowest value in each year.

2.4 MEP characteristics

We gather information on a number of characteristics of EU legislators. Table A-6 displays summary statistics for these variables. We use Gender API, an AI-powered service, to obtain the gender of the MEPs.[14] We use information on the birth year, scraped from each MEP's official EU website, to compute their age. Information on legislators' tenure in the EP is taken from the dataset of Michon and Wiest (2021).

We also recover from their database each MEP's place of birth, which we geocode using Google's API service. Using the geographic coordinates of each location, we match each MEP's city of birth to a NUTS-2 region. For MEPs who were either born outside the European Union or in a different country than the one they represented in the EP we mark the city of birth as missing. We can match 1,444 MEPs to a region of birth.

Lastly, we use different sources to code whether an MEP had a domestic political career (see Table A-1 in the Appendix for more information). We scrape the official websites of each

[14]The service is is available here. Given the legislators' first and last names and the two-digit ISO code of their country of birth as inputs, the API returns the predicted gender together with an associated accuracy score. We manually checked the results of the process.

EU member state's electoral office to compile an exhaustive list of the politicians who ran for national parliaments since the late 1990s.[15] We can thus identify 871 MEPs (i.e., 52.91%) that ran at least once in their career for an MP position in their country of origin. Based on this information, we construct the indicator variable *Candidate for National Parliament*$_{i,t}$, which is equal to 1 if an MEP ran in a general election before year t. We also identify 478 MEPs (i.e., 29.04%) who actually won a seat in a national parliament. To identify this subset of MEPs, we construct the indicator variable *Seat in National Parliament*$_{i,t}$, which is equal to 1 if an MEP was elected before year t. The number of elected MEPs increases to 549 (i.e., 33.35%) if we further include regional parliaments.[16] The indicator variable *Seat in National or Regional Parliament*$_{i,t}$ is equal to 1 for MEPs who held a seat in a domestic parliament before year t.

2.5 Constituency characteristics

2.5.1 Trade policy interests

To capture a constituency's trade policy interests, we follow Conconi *et al.* (2012, 2014) and construct the variable *Export Ratio*$_{c(k),t}$, which measures the extent to which employment in constituency c (in country k) is in export-oriented versus import-competing sectors. Below we describe the two-step procedure to construct this variable.

Sector classification In the first step, we classify sectors into export-oriented or import-competing. To this purpose, we collect information on bilateral trade flows at the product level from the BACI dataset (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).[17] The data cover trade flows between 230 countries and span the period from 2005 to 2020. The 2002 HS classification is used in 2005 and 2006, while the remaining years use the 2007 version. We use correspondence tables provided by the UN Statistics Division to convert the data from the 2002 to the 2007 classification.[18] We then use correspondence tables to match HS 2007 six-digit product

[15] When available, we use already existing election data from Kollman *et al.* (2019).

[16] We collect information on all member state with important regional parliaments (Belgium, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom).

[17] The BACI dataset reports trade flows at the 6-digit level using the Harmonized System (HS) classification. For example, product code 04.06.20 corresponds to *"Dairy produce; cheese of all kinds, grated or powdered"*.

[18] Product codes may change from one classification to another. When one code is associated with several codes in the new classification, we split trade flows equally between all matched codes. We then collapsed the data at the product level in order to obtain one bilateral trade flow for each product code. The correspondence table was downloaded from here.

codes to two-digit sectors in the NACE Rev. 2 nomenclature.[19,20,21]

We also obtain bilateral data for trade in services from the WTO-OECD Balanced Trade in Services (BaTiS) dataset.[22] The data cover trade in services for over 200 trade partners between 2005 and 2019. We use linear extrapolation on the available service data to obtain trade flows for 2020 to match the period covered by the BACI trade data. The classification used is the Extended Balance of Payments Services classification (EBOPS) of 2010, which we manually assign to NACE Rev. 2 sector codes using the matching described in Table A-5.

We use the trade data to define the indicator variable $X_{j,k,t}$, which is equal to 1 if country k's aggregate exports in industry j in year t exceed its aggregate imports in that industry. In line with Conconi *et al.* (2012, 2014), we use this variable to identify comparative advantage (export-oriented) vs disadvantage (import-competing) sectors. To account for potential measurement error and better gauge trends in trade flows, we fit linear time trends to imports and exports. Figure A-3 provides examples for three manufacturing sectors in Germany.

We use information on aggregate rather than bilateral trade flows to distinguish between export-oriented and import-competing sectors. There are two main reasons for this. First, even before MEPs vote on the approval of a trade agreement, trade flows between the EU and the FTA partner(s) can change in anticipation of the vote. Second, bilateral trade flows between FTA members are more likely to lead to measurement error, since they are contaminated by differences in pre-agreement tariffs and by the introduction of rules of origin (e.g., Conconi *et al.*, 2018). This would make it harder to identify the underlying patterns of comparative advantage.

Sector employment In the second step, we collect data on employment in each NUTS-2 region at the sector level. From the Eurostat's Structural Business Statistics (SBS) series,

[19]Going from six-digit HS products to two-digit NACE sectors involves several steps. First, we match six-digit HS 2007 codes to their counterparts in the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev. 3. The HS 2007 to ISIC Rev. 3 correspondence table is available here. We then use correspondence tables to go from the ISIC Rev. 3 to the ISIC Rev. 3.1, and from the ISIC Rev. 3.1 to the ISIC Rev. 4. Finally, we map ISIC Rev. 4 codes with 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 sector codes. The correspondence tables for the different ISIC revisions and from the ISIC Rev. 4 to the NACE Rev. 2 are available here.

[20]We also use Pierce and Schott (2012)'s correspondence tables for the sectors that fail to be matched in the preceding steps.

[21]For example, HS product 04.06.20 (*"Dairy produce; cheese of all kinds, grated or powdered"*) is matched to NACE sector C10 (*"Manufacture of food products"*).

[22]We use the version of the dataset released in 2021. The most recent version is available here.

we obtain the number of persons employed in 67 two-digit NACE Rev. 2 sectors.[23] Because the SBS series does not report data for all sectors of activity, we also extract employment in ten aggregate sectors from the Labor Force Survey's (LFS) regional series.[24] We then apply two-digit SBS sector shares to LFS aggregates in order to harmonize the two datasets. Specifically, the level of employment in sector j in region r (in country k) is

$$Emp_{j,r(k)} = \frac{Emp^{SBS}_{j,r}}{\sum_i Emp^{SBS}_{i,r}} Emp^{LFS}_{j,r}, \tag{1}$$

where the summation is over all 2-digit SBS sectors contained within a given LFS sector. Overall, we compute employment for 67 two-digit sectors and four aggregate sectors.

Export ratio We combine the indicator variable $X_{j,k,t}$ with sector-level employment as defined in (1) to compute the export ratio of each region:

$$Export\ Ratio_{r(k),t} \equiv \frac{\sum_j X_{j,k,t} * Emp_{j,r(k),t}}{\sum_j (1 - X_{j,k,t}) * Emp_{j,r(k),t}}. \tag{2}$$

This is the ratio between total employment in export-oriented industries and total employment in import-competing industries in region r of country k.

Figure 7 plots the export ratio across the 267 NUTS-2 regions included in our sample, averaged from 2009 to 2020. Figure 7a shows the export-ratio computed using tradable goods only (i.e., agriculture, mining, and manufacturing), while Figure 7b also includes service sectors for which trade data are available. Several patterns stand out. First, there is important variation across members states. German regions tend to have the highest export ratios, independently on whether tradable services are included in the construction of the measure or not. Second, including trade in services improves the export competitiveness of certain regions specialized in the service sector, such as London, the south of Ireland, or Brussels.

[23] The original dataset has a significant number of missing values (17.9%). Whenever possible, we use linear interpolation to fill in missing values, reducing the share of missing values to 1.7%. The results are robust to discarding missing observations.

[24] The LFS reports aggregate employment in agriculture, forestry, and fishing (NACE code A), industry (NACE codes B through E), construction (NACE code F), wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation, and food service activities (NACE codes G through I), information and communication (NACE code J), financial and insurance activities (NACE code K), real estate activities (NACE code L), professional, scientific and technical activities, administrative and support service activities (NACE codes M through N), public administration, defense, education, human health, and social work activities (NACE codes O through Q), arts, entertainment and recreation, other service activities, activities of household and extra-territorial organizations and bodies (NACE codes R through U).

Figure 7

Average export ratio across NUTS-2 regions, 2009-2020

(a) Export ratio for tradable goods (b) Export ratio for tradable goods and services



Notes: This figure shows the spatial distribution of the average export ratio across NUTS-2 regions between 2009 and 2020. Darker shades of red correspond to greater export ratios.

The export ratio of European constituency c can be similarly constructed:

$$Export\ Ratio_{c(k),t} \equiv \frac{\sum_j X_{j,k,t} * Emp_{j,c(k),t}}{\sum_j (1 - X_{j,k,t}) * Emp_{j,c(k),t}}, \tag{3}$$

where the numerator (denominator) is the total employment in export-oriented (import-competing) sectors in constituency c in country k. Recall that for most countries the constituency is the entire country (see Figure 2).

We alternatively construct the trade ratio at the level of the national party of each MEP, combining the regional export ratio defined in equation (2) with the share of votes obtained by each party in different regions (see Section 3.3). We also construct a measure to capture the trade policy interests of the region in which MEPs were born (see Section 3.4.1).

2.6 Socio-economic covariates

We use additional Eurostat publications to compute several socio-economic covariates. For each constituency, we measure the local supply of skilled labor as the share of residents who have completed some form of tertiary education. To capture the efficiency of labor markets, we compute unemployment rates. We also construct the share of households who live in cities, towns, and suburbs as a proxy for urbanization rates. In robustness checks, we

control for the number of large firms in a constituency.[25]

2.7 Political covariates

We use Eurobarometer data to construct a series of political covariates. First, we compute a measure of the ideological positioning on the left-right political spectrum. Every Eurobarometer survey asks respondents to place their political views on a left-right political scale, with "1" denoting the most left-wing position and "10" the most right-wing position. For each constituency, we compute the average positioning of the people who answered this question. Second, Eurobarometer surveys track whether respondents trust political parties and the EU (among other institutions). We use the answers to this question to compute the share of individuals in a constituency who tend to trust political parties and the EU, respectively. Table A-7 presents descriptive statistics for EU constituencies.

2.8 Electoral data

We also collect data on the final results of all European elections that took place since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Specifically, we retrieve the number of votes each national party obtained in each NUTS-2 region. Table A-3 presents detailed information on how European elections are run across the 27 EU members states and the United Kingdom.

We use these data to construct a constituency-level measure of political support for pro-trade parties in European elections.[26] We proceed in three steps to construct this variable. First, we aggregate regional electoral data to compute the total number of votes received by a national party in European constituency c in the European elections in year t. We then match national political parties to EU political groups to create the variable $Party\ Votes_{c,p,t}$, which measures the number of votes received by European political party p in constituency c at time t. To this purpose, we first count the number of MEPs from a national party that joined each European party. [27] We then match each national party to the European party that includes the highest number of MEPs belonging to that national party.[28]

[25]The data come from Eurostat's SBS at the country level. Firms are defined as large if they employ more than 250 (or more than 50) workers. Unlike the export ratio, this variable does not include agriculture, forestry, and fishing.

[26]This variable is time-varying at intervals of 5 years, matching the years of the European elections in our sample: 2009, 2014, and 2019.

[27]National parties might participate to elections as part of coalitions, in this case we observe the number of votes cast in support of the coalition. We create a crosswalk for all member states and elections in the sample to match coalitions to national parties reported by MEPs.

[28]There are 3 parties for which we obtain ties in the number of MEPs belonging to each European party.

Second, we use our sample of votes to construct the variable $Pro\text{-}Trade_p$, which measures the extent to which European party p is pro-trade. This is the share of votes cast by members of the party in favor of the ratification of trade agreements over the total number of trade votes cast by MEPs belonging to that party. We also create a binary version of this variable, which is equal to 1 if the share of votes in favor of trade agreements is above or equal to 0.5, and 0 otherwise.

Finally, we can construct the variable

$$Share\ of\ Votes\ to\ Pro\text{-}Trade\ Parties_{c,t} = \frac{\sum_p \Big(Party\ \ Votes_{c,p,t} * Pro\text{-}Trade_p \Big)}{Electorate_{c,t}}, \tag{4}$$

where $Electorate_{c,t}$ is the number of eligible voters in constituency c in election year t. Equation 4 captures time varying political support for pro-trade parties in European elections.[29]

3 Are MEPs responsive to constituencies' interests?

3.1 Identification strategy

Regression model We study the determinants of MEPs' voting patterns on trade agreements by estimating the following regression model:

$$Prob(\ Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)} = 1) = F\big(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Export\ Ratio_{c,t-1} + \beta_2 Z_{i,t} + \beta_3 Z_{c,t} + \delta_a + \delta_p + \varepsilon_{i(c,p),a(t)}\big), \tag{5}$$

where $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$ is equal to 1 if MEP i, elected in constituency c, and belonging to European political party p, votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. In the baseline specification, we disregard abstentions. Because the dependent variable is binary, we estimate a standard discrete choice model (i.e. a logit) and therefore F denotes the cumulative standard logistic distribution. We report robust standard errors clustered at the MEP level for all specifications.

The main explanatory variable of interest is the export ratio of the constituency in which the MEP was elected, as defined in equation (3). We always use the export ratio in the year preceding the vote to mitigate concerns related to reverse causality.

We also address concerns about omitted variable bias by controlling for various MEP-

We drop these national parties.

[29] Notice that the numerator accounts only for votes to national parties that obtained seats in the European Parliament in the European election at time t, since we cannot link national parties to European ones if there are no MEPs belonging to that national party.

and constituency-specific characteristics as well as a rich set of fixed effects. $Z_{i,t}$ is a vector of MEP characteristics that include age, gender, and tenure in the EP. Z_{ct} is a vector of pre-determined socio-economic (the share of the population with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, the urbanization rate) and political (ideological positioning of the constituency, trust in political parties, trust in the EU) covariates interacted with year fixed effects. δ_a is an agreement-specific fixed effect that controls for all characteristics that would make an agreement easier to adopt. δ_p is a European party-specific fixed effect. Its inclusion allows us to control in a flexible way for the overall positioning of a party with respect to trade policy. In robustness checks, we also consider specifications that include MEP-specific fixed effects. The use of these effects, while extremely demanding, allows us to account for any time-invariant observable MEP characteristics that could affect their voting behavior.[30]

Instrumental variable Despite including a rich set of covariates and fixed effects, we cannot rule out the possibility that export ratios are correlated with unobserved constituency characteristics that also shape MEPs' voting patterns. To address such concerns, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To understand our IV approach, remember that the export ratio is made of two elements: we first classify industries as export-oriented and import-competing, and then use employment data in these industries to compute the index. Thus, ideally, we want to exploit exogenous variation along both dimensions.

Concerning the industry classification, one potential concern is that aggregate trade flows include imports from/exports to the future FTA partners. The classification of industries may thus be correlated with bilateral trade costs, especially in the case of large countries like Japan or South Korea. To mitigate such concerns, we exclude trade flows with the future FTA partner when classifying industries. We denote by $X_{j,k,a(t)}$ the indicator variable that takes the value 1 if industry j in country k is export-oriented in year t, and 0 otherwise. Notice that the classification varies across agreements since we exclude trade flows with the future FTA partner a.

The allocation of employment across sectors can be subject to constituency-specific shocks, which the MEPs may take into account when deciding whether to vote in favor or against a trade agreement. To isolate exogenous variation in the allocation of employment, we follow the approach an approach similar to Autor *et al.* (2013) and Colantone and Stanig (2018b), comparing EU member states to similar countries. Specifically, we use 2-digit ISIC Rev. 4 employment data in non-EU OECD countries from the International Labour

[30]Note that in these specifications, the MEP characteristics $Z_{i,t}$ are dropped due to collinearity with the MEP- and agreement-specific fixed effects.

Organization (ILO).[31] Employment data are not available for some non-EU OECD countries, so we restrict the analysis to Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.[32] We match EU member states to non-EU OECD countries that belong to the same income group, as defined by the World Bank in 2008.[33]

For each constituency c (in country k, belonging to income group g), we instrument the employment variable in equation (3) with $Emp_{j,g,t}$. As discussed in Section 2, this is the average share of employment in sector j across non-EU OECD countries belonging to income group g in year t.[34] We argue that the evolution of these shares over the sample period captures broader trends in the global economy (e.g., technological shocks) and is unlikely to be correlated with local shocks affecting EU constituencies.

The instrumental variable for the export ratio of constituency c (in country k belonging to income group g) can thus be defined as:

$$Export\ Ratio\ IV_{c(k(g)),a(t)} \equiv \frac{\sum_j X_{j,k,a(t)} * Emp_{j,g,t}}{\sum_j (1 - X_{j,k,a(t)}) * Emp_{j,g,t}}. \tag{6}$$

Several qualifications are in order. First, we apply the same non-EU sector shares to all EU member states belonging to the same income group. Variation across countries within an income group g in year t is therefore driven by the industry classification identifiers, $X_{j,k,a(t)}$. Second, variation over time in the instrument comes both from changes in the allocation of labor across industries in non-EU countries (i.e., $Emp_{j,g,t}$) and changes in the industry classification (i.e., $X_{j,k,a(t)}$).

We implement our IV approach using a two-step procedure. In the first step, we use least squares to regress the potentially endogenous export ratios on the instrumental variable and the set of covariates and fixed effects. In the second step, we re-estimate equation (5) by

[31] The list of non-EU28 OECD members includes Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.

[32] Canada and New Zealand are not in the ILO dataset. For other countries (Israel, Chile, and Republic of Korea), the employment data are missing for many years and sectors. For Australia, the data is provided using a different sector classification.

[33] Based on the World Bank classification, five EU countries were upper-middle income in 2008 (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania), while the remaining EU member states were classified as high-income. Non-EU OECD countries are also divided into high-income (Iceland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States) and upper-middle-income (Mexico and Turkey). The classification can be found here.

[34] Note that the export ratio defined in (3) can be re-written in terms of employment shares:

$$Export\ Ratio_{c(k),t} \equiv \frac{\sum_j X_{j,k,t} Emp_{j,c(k),t}}{\sum_j (1 - X_{j,k,t}) Emp_{j,c(k),t}} = \frac{\sum_j X_{j,k,t} \frac{Emp_{j,c(k),t}}{Emp_{c(k),t}}}{\sum_j (1 - X_{j,k,t}) \frac{Emp_{j,c(k),t}}{Emp_{c(k),t}}} = \frac{\sum_j X_{j,k,t} \%\ Emp_{j,c(k),t}}{\sum_j (1 - X_{j,k,t}) \%\ Emp_{j,c(k),t}}.$$

logit while controlling for the residual obtained in the first step.

3.2 Main results

Table 1 reports the marginal effects of the export ratio on the probability of voting in favor of an FTA. The point estimate in column 1 corresponds to the most parsimonious specification of equation (5) and only includes agreement- and European party-specific fixed effects. We find that higher export ratios are associated with a higher probability of voting in favor of an FTA. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.

Table 1
MEP's votes and trade interests of their constituencies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***	0.007***	0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.749	0.749	0.748	0.749	0.747

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio from logit regressions, evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if MEP i (elected in EU constituency c, and belonging to European political party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The legislator controls include gender, age, and tenure of the MEP. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

The specification in column 2 adds MEP controls. The marginal effect of the export ratio is similar in size to the estimate in column 1 and remains statistically significant. In column 3, we include pre-determined socio-economic controls that are interacted with year-specific fixed effects. In column 4, we further add pre-determined political controls interacted with

year-specific fixed effects. In both specifications, the marginal effect of the export ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1%. Column 5, which corresponds to our preferred specification, also controls for constituency-specific fixed effects, accounting for any time-invariant characteristic of an EU constituency that may affect the voting behavior of its representatives. The marginal effect of the export ratio on MEP's votes is positive and significant. In terms of magnitude, we find that a one standard deviation (2.02) increase in the export ratio raises the probability of a vote in favor of an FTA by 4.24 percentage points.

We can use the estimates from column 5 to carry out counterfactual experiments. Specifically, we compute the probability of voting in favor of an FTA if the export ratio of all constituencies is subject to a negative shock. We then count the number of MEPs who are likely to switch their votes under this counterfactual, that is, the number of MEPs for whom the probability of voting in favor of an FTA decreases below 0.5 following the shock. For example, a 20% decrease in $Export\ Ratio_{c,t-1}$ would lead to 17 MEPs switching to a negative vote on the agreements with Canada. A 50% decrease in $Export\ Ratio_{c,t-1}$ would induce 41 MEPS to change their vote to a negative one.

It is interesting to compare the results of Table 1 with the corresponding results for the United States. To this purpose, we use data from Conconi *et al.* (2014) on the approval of trade agreements in the US Congress. [35] The effects are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in the European Parliament: a one standard deviation (0.54) increase in the export ratio of a US state increases by 4.81 percentage points the probability that its representative votes in favor of a trade agreement. These estimates are obtained in a specification similar to our baseline, which includes various controls for MEP and constituency characteristics, as well as party, agreement and constituency fixed effects (see column 4 of Table A-8 in the Appendix).

In Table 2, we further report results from regressions that include MEP-specific fixed effects. Their inclusion allows us to account for any characteristic of an EU legislator (e.g., ideology, background) that may affect their voting behavior on trade agreements. In these regressions, the coefficient on the export ratio is identified only by variation within the 364 MEPs who voted both in favor and against an FTA during their tenure in the EP (i.e., the switchers).[36] Notice that the sample is significantly reduced as compared to Table 1. The coefficients on the export ratio remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.

[35] We focus on votes in US Senate, in which the legislators represent stable constituencies. In the House of Representatives, the constituencies change boundaries due to periodical redistricting.

[36] Interestingly, all EU constituencies have at least one MEP who switched position on trade agreements. The only exceptions are three constituencies in Poland (Podlaskie and Warmian-Masurian, Pomeranian, Subcarpathian).

Kwak *et al* (2021) argue that the conditional logit estimator is not robust in setups where the conditional serial independence assumption is violated. To test the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the specification with MEP fixed effects using a linear probability model. The point estimates remain positive and highly significant, as shown in Table A-9 in the Appendix.

Table 2

MEP's votes and trade interests of their constituencies (including MEP fixed effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.478***	0.631***	0.975***
	(0.139)	(0.151)	(0.173)
Socio-economic controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
MEP FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,127	3,127	3,127
Estimation method	c. logit	c. logit	c.logit

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if MEP i (elected in EU constituency c, and belonging to European political party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

In our baseline specification, we control for a rich set of covariates and fixed effects in order to mitigate concerns about potential confounding factors. Nevertheless, the point estimates could still suffer from omitted variable bias if the variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ is correlated with other unobserved, time-varying constituency characteristics that also shape MEPs' votes on trade agreements. To address this possibility, we instrument export ratios with the instrumental variable defined in equation (6).

The results reported in Table 3 confirm the responsiveness of MEPs to the trade policy interests of their constituencies. All marginal effects are estimated to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. We further conduct Wald tests to verify whether the coefficients underlying these effects are significantly different from their logit counterparts.

We find that instrumenting the export ratio leads to point estimates that are significantly larger in the specifications of columns 1 and 2. Once we control for the socio-economic controls (column 3), the difference is only significant at the 10%. If we further add the political controls and include constituency fixed effects (columns 4 and 5), the coefficients in Table 3 are not statistically different from those in Table 1.[37] These comparisons suggest that our baseline estimates do not suffer from an omitted variable bias.[38]

Table 3

MEP's votes and trade interests of their constituencies (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.016***	0.016***	0.010***	0.008***	0.021***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	IV logit	IV logit	IV logit	IV logit	IV logit
Pred. probability	0.749	0.749	0.748	0.749	0.747

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using an IV logit model and evaluated at sample means. In the first step, we regress *Export Ratio*$_{c,t}$ on *Export Ratio IV*$_{c(k(g)),a(t)}$, as defined in equation (6), and the remaining control variables specified in each column (the results can be found in Table A-10). In the second step, we use the residuals from the first stage as an additional control in equation 5. The dependent variable is the indicator variable *Vote*$_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if MEP i (elected in EU constituency c, and belonging to European political party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The legislator controls include gender, age, and tenure of the MEP. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

[37] We further compared the marginal fixed effects implied by the two sets of coefficients using the procedure described in Mize *et al.* (2019), reaching the same conclusion.

[38] We obtain similar results if we compare the coefficients in Table A-11, in which we estimate equation (5) using a linear probability model, with the corresponding two-stage-least-squares estimates in Table A-12. Performing Wald tests reveals that the coefficients reported in columns 4 and 5 of these tables are not significantly different from each other.

3.3 Additional robustness checks

We report in the Appendix the results of a series of additional robustness checks. In the main analysis, the trade policy interests of a constituency are defined using only tradable goods (i.e., agriculture, mining, and manufacturing) for which reliable trade data are available. Table A-13 shows that the results are robust to constructing the export ratio by considering additional service sectors that can be traded internationally.

In Table A-14, we use citizens' stated trade opinions from the Eurobarometer survey to capture a constituency's trade policy interests. As mentioned in Section 2, data on trade opinions is missing for several years in our sample period. Moreover, the Eurobarometer survey is designed to guarantee a representative sample at the level of member state. We thus construct the variable *Pro-Trade Opinions*$_{c(k),t}$ at the level of each country k, using the share of respondents who expressed a positive view of free trade in the most recent available Eurobarometer survey. Notwithstanding the data limitations, the coefficient of this variable is always positive and statistically significant.

We have also verified that our findings hold if we construct the trade ratio at the level of each MEP's national party. The logic of this robustness check is that, given that European legislators in all member states are elected by some form of proportional rule (see Table A-3) and that national parties control the selection of candidates for seats in the European Parliament, the main "constituents" for each MEP should be the supporters of his or her national party. We, therefore, construct an alternative measure of trade policy interests that is a weighted average of regional export ratios, with the weights given by the share of votes obtained by a national party in every region.[39] Note that this measure of trade policy interests varies at the national party and constituency levels. Table A-15 shows that our baseline results are robust to using this alternative export ratio.

In Table A-16 we control for whether MEPs had a domestic political career before joining the European Parliament. Some studies find that career politicians are more educated than the average population. For example, using administrative register data on the entire population of Sweden, Dal Bó *et al.* (2017) show that politicians are underrepresented at the bottom levels of education and overrepresented at higher levels. There is also evidence that individuals with higher education are far more likely to favor trade openness (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). Everything else the same, we would thus expect career politicians to be more likely to vote in favor of trade agreements. In line

[39] We construct this alternative export ratio as *Export Ratio*$_{p(k),t} \equiv \sum_r$ *Export Ratio*$_{r(k)t} \times \phi_{p(k),r,t}$, where $\phi_{p(k),r}$ is the share of votes obtained by national party p in region r in the European elections prior to t.

with this presumption, the coefficients of the variables *Seat in National Parliament*$_{i,t-1}$ and *Seat in National or Regional Parliament*$_{i,t-1}$ are positive and significant, indicating that MEPs with a previous political career are more likely to vote in favor or trade agreements. In terms of magnitude, the estimates in column 4 (column 6) imply that having held a seat in the national (national or regional) parliament increases the probability of support for trade agreements by 2.1 (1.4) percentage points. Crucially, the coefficient of the variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ is never statistically different from the corresponding estimates in Table 1, confirming that MEPs' voting behavior reflects the interests of their EU constituencies.

A final robustness check is related to abstentions, which are excluded from our baseline analysis. Our main findings are robust to including abstentions and coding them either as negative (Table A-17) or positive votes (Table A-18).

3.4 Alternative interpretations of our findings

Against widespread claims that European legislators are bureaucratic and unresponsive, the results above show that MEPs' votes on the approval of trade agreements are sensitive to the interests of their EU constituencies. In this section, we discuss and rule out two alternative interpretations of our findings.

3.4.1 Regional Favoritism

A large literature shows that politicians tend to favor the regions in which they are born (e.g., Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Burgess *et al.*, 2015). One may thus be concerned that our results could not be driven by MEPs responding to the interests of EU constituency, but by the interests of their birth region. In what follows, we show that, even when excluding the region in which EU legislators were born, their voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of the EU constituency they represent.[40]

To construct the export ratio of MEPs' region of birth, we define an indicator variable *Birth*$_{i,r(k)}$ equal to 1 if MEP i was born in NUTS-2 region r in country k, and 0 otherwise.

[40] Anecdotal evidence suggests that MEPs may take into account "parochial" interests when voting on trade agreements. Claudio Morganti, for instance, is an MEP elected on the lists of the Lega Nord (part of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy political group in the EP) who represented the Central Italy constituency between 2009 and 2014. After voting against the FTA between the EU and South Korea, he declared: "I come from Prato, a town that was once considered one of the most important textile areas in Europe. Today, unfair competition from Asia has turned it into a ghost town, because business in Prato has been utterly devastated" (declaration taken from the minutes of the debate in the European Parliament on February 17, 2011).

As mentioned in Section 2, this variable can only be defined for 1,444 MEPs.[41] The export ratio of the region of birth of MEP i is computed as:

$$\textit{Export Ratio Birth}_{i,t} = \sum_r \textit{Birth}_{i,r} \times \textit{Export Ratio}_{r(k),t},$$

where $\textit{Export Ratio}_{r(k),t}$ is defined in equation (2).

We can then construct the variable $\textit{Export Ratio}_{i,t}$, which captures the trade policy interests of MEP i's EU constituency, *excluding* his/her region of birth.[42]

Table 4

MEP's votes and trade interests of their constituency
(MEPs born in the EU, excluding region of birth)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\textit{Export Ratio}_{i,t-1}$	0.007***	0.020***		
	(0.002)	(0.006)		
$\textit{Export Ratio Birth}_{i,t-1}$			0.003***	0.002*
			(0.001)	(0.001)
MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7.727	7.650	7.727	7.650
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.738	0.738	0.746	0.744

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $\textit{Vote}_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if MEP i (elected in EU constituency c, and belonging to European political party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable $\textit{Export Ratio}_{i,t-1}$ captures the trade policy interest MEP i's EU constituency, excluding his/her region of birth. The variable $\textit{Export Ratio Birth}_{i,t-1}$ captures the trade policy interest of i's region of birth. The legislator controls include gender, age, and tenure of the MEP. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

[41] In this exercise, we do not consider MEPs from countries that are not divided into at least two NUTS-2 regions. Because of NUTS-2 border changes, we also discard Slovenia. Lastly, we drop from the sample MEPs born in a different country than the one they represent in the EP.

[42] $\textit{Export Ratio}_{i,t}$ is constructed excluding the region r for which $\textit{Birth}_{i,r} = 1$ from the formula in (3).

In Table 4 we examine whether MEPs' trade votes reflect the interests of their EU constituency, when this excludes their region of birth. Columns 1 and 2 reproduce the specifications of columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, replacing the variable *Export Ratio*$_{ck,t}$ with *Export Ratio*$_{i,t}$. The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that our baseline findings are not driven by the interests of MEPs' region of birth.

Columns 3 and 4 show that MEPs' voting behavior is also aligned with the trade policy interests of their birth region. Notice that we cannot include the variables *Export Ratio*$_{i,t}$ and *Export Ratio Birth*$_{i,t}$ in the same specifications, since they are highly correlated.[43] This is not surprising, since the region of birth of an MEP is usually contained in his/her EU constituency. Notice that this is always true for countries that have a single EU constituency; for the other countries, it is true in almost 65% of the cases.[44] Going back to the example of Claudio Morganti, his region of birth (ITI1) is contained in the EU constituency he represented in the European Parliament (Central Italy).

3.4.2 Lobbying by Large Firms

Another possible concern is that our results could be driven by pressure from lobby groups. Several studies show that large firms dominate lobbying on trade policy (e.g., Kim 2018; Osgood, 2017; Blanga-Gubbay *et al.*, 2023). These studies exploit detailed information available under the US Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), which requires individuals and organizations to file semi-annual reports providing detailed information on their lobbying activities at the federal level.[45]

Unfortunately, lobbying data in the EU is much more limited.[46] Neveretheless, we can check whether our results are robust to controlling for the number of large firms in MEPs' constituencies. Table 5 shows that our results are unaffected when we account for the presence of large firms.

[43]The correlation between these variables is 0.69 and significant at the 1% level. A regression of *Export Ratio Birth*$_{i,t}$ on *Export Ratio*$_{i,t}$ and the set of FEs from column 4 of Table 44 yields a coefficient of 0.93 significant at the 1% level. The coefficient increases to 0.95, and is still significant at 1% level, when including the controls used in column 4 of Table 44.

[44]This percentage excludes MEPs born in the Brussels region (split between two EU constituencies) and in Ireland (for which there is no perfect overlap between NUTS2 regions and EU constituencies).

[45]Lobbyists must disclose all their expenditures and the specific policy issues targeted. Lobbying activities encompass all efforts to influence the thinking of legislators or other covered federal officials for or against a specific cause. As stated in the LDA, they include lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, preparation and planning activities, research, and other background work.

[46]The EP, the EU Council, and the European Commission have adopted an inter-institutional agreement to make certain activities of interest representation conditional upon registration. However, this agreement does not have a formal basis in EU treaties and the registration itself remains voluntary, limiting the collection of systematic data on efforts to influence EU institutions.

Table 5
MEP's votes and trade interests of their constituency
(controlling for large firms)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.010***	0.021***	0.008***	0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Large Firms$_{k,t-1}$	-0.011**	0.099**	-0.007	0.169***
	(0.005)	(0.050)	(0.005)	(0.061)
MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,177	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.749	0.747	0.749	0.747

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio from logit regressions, evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if MEP i (elected in EU constituency c, and belonging to European political party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The variable *Large Firms*$_{k,t-1}$ is the logarithm of one plus the number of firms with more than 250 employees (columns 1-2) or above 50 employees (columns 3-4) at the country-level, k, in year $t-1$. The legislator controls include gender, age, and tenure of the MEP. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

3.5 Trade policy interests and support for pro-trade parties

Much of the variation in MEPs' voting behavior on trade agreements is explained by their EU party affiliation.[47] In a well-functioning democracy, voters elect political parties that have policy platforms in line with their preferences. If some voters consider trade as a salient policy issue in European elections, we would then expect EU constituencies that are more export-oriented to elect a larger share of MEPs affiliated to pro-trade parties. To verify whether this is the case, we examine whether electoral support for pro-trade parties

[47] We can employ the Shapley decomposition to identify the contribution of the EU party fixed effects in explaining the variance of MEP's votes of trade agreement. In our baseline specification (column 5 of Table 1), around 75% of this variance is explained by party fixed effects.

in European elections depends on the trade policy interests of EU constituencies:

$$\textit{Share of Votes for Pro-Trade Parties}_{c,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Export Ratio}_{c,t-1} + \delta_c + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{c,t}, \tag{7}$$

where $\textit{Share of Votes for Pro-Trade Parties}_{c,t}$ is a variable capturing political support in favor of trade agreements in constituency c in the European elections at time t (see equation 4). $\textit{Export Ratio}_{c,t-1}$ captures the trade exposure of constituency c in the year before the elections, and δ_c and δ_t capture constituency and election fixed effects, respectively.

Figure 8 illustrates the results of estimating (7) when using a binary version of the variable $\textit{Pro-Trade}_p$ to construct $\textit{Share of Votes for Pro-Trade Parties}_{c,t}$. The results using the continuous version indicate that European constituencies that should gain more from trade agreements are more likely to vote for pro-trade parties in European elections (see Table A-19 in the Appendix). These findings provide further evidence against the idea that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit.

Figure 8

Export ratio and political support for pro-trade parties



Notes: The figure is a scatterplot based on estimating equation (7). The variable $\textit{Share of Votes for Pro-Trade Parties}_{c,t}$ is constructed using a binary version of the variable $\textit{Pro-Trade}_p$.

4 Conclusions

Much of what the EU does requires the approval of the European Parliament, whose members are directly elected by European voters. MEPs are often accused of being disconnected from European voters. This Eurosceptic argument is widespread in the media and in scholarly debates and has played an important role in the Brexit campaign. It is also an integral part of the populist rhetoric.

Surprisingly, however, there is little evidence of whether European legislators respond to the interests of their electorate in their policy choices. In this paper, we investigate this question by studying the determinants of MEPs' votes on the approval of trade agreements, a key policy of the EU. To this aim, we construct a new dataset of roll-call votes on the approval of 15 trade agreements negotiated by the EU since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

We find that MEPs who represent constituencies with a higher share of jobs in export-oriented versus import-competing industries are more likely to vote in favor of these agreements. The results are robust to controlling for a rich set of covariates and different types of fixed effects. They also continue to hold when we use an instrument for the trade policy interests of European constituencies based on sectoral employment data from non-EU OECD countries. In terms of magnitude, our baseline estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the export ratio raises the probability of a vote in favor of a trade agreement by almost 4 percentage points. The effects are very similar to those found for trade votes in the US Congress. We can use our estimates to carry out counterfactual exercises and predict how many MEPs would change their vote on each trade agreement following a negative shock to the trade policy interests of their constituents. We rule out alternative explanations for our findings on MEPs trade votes. In particular, we show that our results are not driven by the more "parochial" trade policy interests of MEPs' region of birth or by the presence of large lobbying firms in their EU constituencies. We also show that the trade policy interests of a constituency affect support for pro-trade parties in European elections.

Overall, our analysis provides evidence against the idea that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit: EU legislators' decisions on trade agreements reflect the trade policy interests of their EU constituencies, which also shape voters' decisions about which parties to support in European elections.

An interesting avenue for future research is to exploit the fact that many agreements in our sample (all but those with Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam) were negotiated as mixed trade agreements. Under Article 5.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU

can act internationally and negotiate international agreements under three different types of competencies: exclusive competencies, competencies to "support, coordinate or supplement" the actions of the member states, and shared competencies. Agreements negotiated by the EU that include provisions outside its exclusive competencies should be concluded as "mixed" and must be ratified following not only the procedures set out in the EU treaties (Article 218 TFEU) but also the national ratification procedures of the member states. These are extremely complex, as they may require the approval of 26 Member States in their national parliaments, involving 36 chambers, as well as regional parliaments in the case of Belgium (see Conconi *et al.*, 2021). Collecting data on these votes would allow comparing or national and EU legislators to their constituencies' interests.

References

Arrow, K. J. (1963, originally published in 1951). *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Autor, D. H., D. Dorn, G. H. Hanson, and K. Majlesi (2020). "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure," *American Economic Review* 110, 3139-3183.

Bellodi, L., M. Morelli, and M. Vannoni (2023). "A Costly Commitment: Populism, Economic Performance, and the Quality of Bureaucracy," *American Journal of Political Science* 0, 1–17.

Besley, T., and R. Burgess (2002). "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117, 1415-1451.

Blanga-Gubbay, M., P. Conconi, and M. Parenti (2023). "Lobbying for Globalization," forthcoming in the *Economic Journal*.

Bown, C., P. Conconi, A. Erbahar, and L. Trimarchi (2023). "Politically Motivated Trade Protection," mimeo.

Brollo, F., and T. Nannicini (2012). "Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil," *American Political Science Review* 106, 742-761.

Burgess, R., R. Jedwab, E. Miguel, A. Morjaria, G. Padró i Miquel (2015). "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," *American Economic Review* 105, 1817-1851.

Che, Y., Y. Lu, J. Pierce, P. Schott, and Z. Tao (2022). "Did Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?," *Journal of International Economics* 139.

Colantone, I., and P. Stanig (2018a). "Global Competition and Brexit, *American Political Science Review* 112, 201-218.

Colantone, I., and P. Stanig (2018b). "The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe," *American Journal of Political Science* 62, 936-953.

Colantone, I., G. I. Ottaviano, and P. Stanig (2022). ""The Backlash of Globalization," in G. Gopinath, E. Helpman, and K. S. Rogoff (eds.), *Handbook of International Economics*.

Conconi, P., G. Facchini, and M. Zanardi (2012). "Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 4, 146-189.

Conconi, P., G. Facchini, and M. Zanardi (2014). "Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reforms: the Protectionist Effect of Elections," *Journal of International Economics* 94, 102-118.

Conconi, P., M. Garcia Santana, L. Puccio, and R. Venturini (2018). "From Final Goods to Inputs: The Protectionist Effect of Preferential Rules of Origin," *American Economic Review* 108, 2335-2365.

Conconi, P., C. Herghelegiu, and L. Puccio (2021). "EU Trade Agreements: To Mix or not to Mix, That is the Question," *Journal of World Trade* 55, 231-260.

Dal Bó, E., F. Finan, O. Folke, T. Persson, J.. Rickne (2017). "Who Becomes a Politician?," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 132, 1877-1914.

De Vries, C. E. (2018). *Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration*. Oxford University Press.

Fisher, P. (2018). *Insufficient Representation: The Disconnect Between Congress and Its Citizens*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Flinders, M. (2015). "The Problem with Democracy," *Parliamentary Affairs*, 69, 181-203.

Foa, R. S., and M. Yascha (2016). "The Democratic Disconnect," *Journal of Democracy* 27, 5-17.

Gaulier, G. and S. Zignago (2010). BACI: International Trade Database at the Product-Level.

Grossman, G., and E. Helpman (1994). "Protection for Sale," *American Economic Review* 84, 833-850.

Guriev, S., and E. Papaioannou (2022). "The Political Economy of Populism," *Journal of Economic Literature* 60, 753-832.

Hagemann, S., S. B. Hobolt, and C. Wratil (2016). "Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council Voting," *Comparative Political Studies* 50, 850-876.

Hainmueller, J., and M. J. Hiscox (2006). "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade," *International Organization* 60, 469-498.

Hix, S. (2008). "Towards a Partisan Theory of EU Politics," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, 1254-1265.

Hix, S., A. Noury, and G. Roland (2006). "Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, 494-511.

Hix, S., and A. Noury (2007). "Politics, Not Economic Interests: Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union," *International Migration Review* 41, 182-205.

Hobolt, S. B., and M. N. Franklin (2011). "Introduction: Electoral Democracy in the European Union," *Electoral Studies* 30, Pages 1-3.

Hodler, R., and P. A. Raschky (2014). "Regional Favoritism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129, 995–1033.

Kim, I. S. (2017). "Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization," *American Political Science Review* 111, 1-20.

Kletzer, L. G. (1998). "International Trade and Job Displacement in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979-1991." In *Imports, Exports, and the American Worker*, edited by Susan M. Collins, 423-72. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Kollman, K., A. Hicken, D. Caramani, D. Backer, and D. Lublin (2019). *Constituency-level elections archive* [data file and codebook]. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan [producer and distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.electiondataarchive.org.

Krugman, P. R. (1979). "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade." *Journal of international Economics*, 9(4), 469-479.

Krugman, P. (1980). "Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade." *The American Economic Review*, 70(5), 950-959.

Kwak, D. W., R. S. Martin, and J. M. Wooldridge (2023). "The Robustness of Conditional Logit for Binary Response Panel Data Models with Serial Correlation," *Journal of Econometric Methods* 12, 33-56.

Lax, J. R., and J. H. Phillips (2012). "The Democratic Deficit in the States," *American Journal of Political Science* 56, 148-66.

Maggi, G., and R. Ossa (2023). "The Political Economy of International Regulatory Cooperation," *American Economic Review* 113, 2168-2200.

Meade, J. (1955). *"Trade and Welfare"*, London: Oxford University Press

Melitz, M.J. (2003), "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity." *Econometrica*, 71: 1695-1725.

Mize, T. D., L. Doan, and J. S. Long (2019). "A General Framework for Comparing Predictions and Marginal Effects Across Models," *Sociological Methodology* 49, 152-189.

Osgood, I. (2017). "The Breakdown of Industrial Opposition to Trade: Firms, Product Variety and Reciprocal Liberalization," *World Politics* 69, 184-231.

Page, B., and R. Shapiro (1983). "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," *American Political Science Review* 77, 175-190.

Pierce, J. R., and P. K. Schott (2012). "Concording U.S. Harmonized System Codes over Time," *Journal of Official Statistics* 28, 53–68.

Sen, A. K. (1970). *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. San Francisco: Holden-Day.

Snyder, J.M., and D. Strömberg (2008). "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," *Journal of Political Economy* 118, 355-408.

Stimson, J. A., M.B. MacKuen, and R.S. Erikson (1995). "Dynamic Representation," *American Political Science Review* 89, 543-565.

Weiler, J.H.H., U.R. Haltern, and F. Mayer (1995). "European Democracy and its Critique," *West European Politics*, 18, 4-39.

Appendices

A-1 NUTS regions

The NUTS classification has three levels. NUTS-1 regions correspond to major socio-economic regions with a population between 3 and 7 million, NUTS-2 regions to basic regions with a population between 800,000 and 3 million, and NUTS-3 regions to small regions with a population between 150,000 and 800,000. As most data are only available at the NUTS-2 level, we use this level of aggregation. Not all member states have distinct regions for every NUTS level. Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Latvia, and Malta, for instance, consist of one NUTS-2 region only. For the remaining member states, the number of NUTS-2 regions varies from two (Croatia and Slovenia) to 38 (Germany). Overall, our dataset includes 262 NUTS-2 regions.

Eurostat and Eurobarometer publications report data at different levels of aggregation over time. For consistency, we fix the boundaries of NUTS-2 regions over time:

- The capital regions of Hungary and Poland were split into two NUTS-2 regions in 2016. Because data for these sub-regions are unavailable prior to this date, we use pre-2016 NUTS-2 regions.
- In Eurobarometer publications, several Italian NUTS-2 regions are reported jointly. We use the same aggregation in our analysis.[48]
- Ireland went from dividing its territory into two NUTS-2 regions to three NUTS-2 regions in 2016. In both versions, NUTS-2 regions are aggregates of historical counties. We thus use county-level population data to construct fixed-boundary NUTS-2 regions over time.[49]
- Slovenia's NUTS-2 borders changed in the 2013 version of the NUTS classification. There is no clear method of converting 2010 NUTS-2 regions into 2013 NUTS-2 regions, so we treat Slovenia as a single NUTS-2 region.
- Several NUTS-2 regions are not covered in the Eurobarometer data and are dropped from the sample.[50]

[48] The aggregation concerns the following regions: Piemonte (ITC1) and Valle d'Aosta (ITC2), Abruzzo (ITF1) and Molise (ITF2), Puglia (ITF4) and Basilicata (ITF5), Trentino (ITH1) and Alto Adige (ITH2).

[49] We first use Census data to obtain population counts at the county level. We then compute the share of every old NUTS-2 region that belongs to a new NUTS-2 region. We finally use these shares to split old NUTS-2 regions across new NUTS-2 regions.

[50] The following NUTS-2 regions are not included in Eurobarometer surveys: North Aegean (EL41), South Aegean (EL42), Ionian Islands (EL62), Ceuta (ES63), Melilla (ES64), Åland (FI20), Corsica (FRM0), the French Overseas (FRY1-FRY5), Açores (PT20), and Madeira (PT30).

A-2 Figures

Figure A-1
Articles on the democratic deficit of the EU



Notes: This figure shows the number of articles on Google Scholars and Factiva mentioning at least one of the following phrases: "Democratic deficit of the EU", "Democratic deficit in the EU", "EU democratic deficit", "Democratic deficit of the European Union", "Democratic deficit in the European Union" or "European Union democratic deficit".

Figure A-2
Articles on Euroscepticism



Notes: This figure shows the number of articles on Google Scholars and Factiva mentioning at least one of the following phrases: "Euroskeptic", "Euroskepticism", "Euro-skeptic" or "Euro-skepticism".

Figure A-3

Classifying industries - an example

(a) C14: Wearing apparel

(b) C29: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers



(c) C16: Wood and products of wood and cork



Notes: This figure provides an example of the methodology used to classify an industry as export-oriented or import-competing. In sector C14, Germany is a net importer throughout the period. The sector is classified as import-competing. By contrast, Germany's exports exceed its imports in sector C29. This sector is classified as export-oriented. Fitting linear time trends does not affect the classification in these two instances. In sector C16, Germany's imports were larger than its exports in 2005 and 2006. The trend reverses for the next four years, after which Germany reverts to being a net importer. Fitting a linear, however, implies only one switch that occurs between 2012 and 2013.

Figure A-3 provides examples for three manufacturing sectors in Germany. In sector C14 (manufacture of wearing apparel), Germany is a net importer throughout the sample period. C14 is, therefore, classified as import-competing. Exports in sector C29 (manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers), on the other hand, exceed imports, and the sector is classified as export-oriented. The use of linear time trends does not affect how we classify industries in these two cases. The picture looks more complicated for sector C16 (manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials). Germany starts by importing slightly more than it exports. The trend reverses in 2007 for the next four years, after which Germany becomes once again a net importer. Fitting linear time trends allows for only one switch to occur (around 2012).

A-3 Tables

Table A-1
National parliaments

Country	Chamber	# seats	Electoral rule	Constituencies	Election years	Source
Austria	The National Council (Nationalrat)	183	Open-list proportional representation	39 (43 before 2013) local electoral districts contained within NUTS-2 districts; seats not allocated at the local level are allocated to candidates running on 9 state lists, each corresponding to a NUTS-2 region; any remaining seats are allocated to candidates running on national lists	1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017, 2019	link
Austria	The Federal Council (Bundesrat)	61	Appointment by the state legislatures according to proportional representation	9 states	Not collected	–
Belgium	Chamber of Representatives (Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, Chambre des Représentants)	150	Open-list proportional representation	11 electoral districts: 10 provinces (5 Dutch-speaking, 5 French-speaking) and Brussels; the electoral districts overlap with NUTS-2 regions	2003, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2019	link1; link2
Belgium	Senate (Senaat, Sénat, Senat)	50	Since 2014, 50 senators are appointed by and from the Parliaments of the federated entities; 10 are co-opted by their peers; before 2014; 40 senators were directly elected	4 federated entities	Not collected	–
Bulgaria	National Assembly (Narodno sabranie)	240	Open-list proportional representation; in 2009, 31 MPs were elected in single-member constituencies using first-past-the-post voting	31 constituencies: 27 provinces that overlap with NUTS-2 regions; Sofia is divided into three constituencies, and Plovdiv into two	2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2021 (Apr), 2021 (Jul), 2021 (Nov), 2022, 2023	link
Croatia	Croatian Parliament (Sabor)	151	Partly open-list proportional representation	10 electoral districts in continental Croatia: none districts are contained within a NUTS-2 region; one district spans over both NUTS-2 regions; 3 seats are reserved for Croatians living abroad, and 8 seats are reserved for minorities	2015, 2016, 2020	CLEA
Cyprus	House of Representatives	80	Open-list proportional representation	6 electoral districts	Not collected	–
Czech Republic	Chamber of Deputies (Poslanecká Sněmovna)	200	Open-list proportional representation	14 multi-member constituencies, which correspond to NUTS-3 regions	2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017, 2021	link
Czech Republic	Senate (Senát)	81	Two-round system	81 single-seat constituencies that may span over distinct NUTS-2 regions	2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022	link
Denmark	Danish Parliament (Folketing)	179	Open-list proportional representation	10 constituencies (17 before 2007) that overlap with NUTS-2 regions, with the exception of Aarhus (DK04 and DK05), Vejle (DK03 and DK04), and Viborg (DK03 and DK04)	2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2022	link
Estonia	Parliament of Estonia (Riigikogu)	101	Open-list proportional representation	12 constituencies	Not collected	–
Finland	Parliament of Finland (Suomen eduskunta)	200	Open-list proportional representation	13 multi-member districts and Åland; constituencies are contained within a NUTS-2 region, with the exception of South-Eastern Finland (FI1C4, FI1C5, and FI1D1) and Vaasa (FI1D5, FI195, and FI194)	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019	link
France	National Assembly (Assemblée nationale)	577	Two-round system	577 constituencies contained within a département (NUTS-3 region)	1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, 2022	link1; link2; CLEA
France	Senate (Sénat)	348	Indirectly elected 150,000 officials (*grands électeurs*) using both a two-round system and proportional representation	109 constituencies	Not collected	–
Germany	Bundestag	598 nominal members	Mixed-member proportional representation: 299 (328 in 1998) seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by open-list at the federal level	Most single-member constituencies are contained within NUTS2 regions, with some exceptions; party lists are submitted at the state level (NUTS1 regions)	1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017, 2021	link
Germany	Bundesrat	69	Appointed by state governments	Federal states	Not collected	–

National parliaments (cont.)

Country	Chamber	# seats	Electoral rule	Constituencies	Election years	Source
Greece	Hellenic Parliament (Ellinikó Koinovoúlio)	300	250 seats by open-list proportional representation; 50 seats are allocated as a bonus to the party receiving the largest share of votes	56 constituencies overlapping with NUTS-3 regions	2007, 2009, 2012 (May), 2012 (June), 2015 (January), 2015 (September), 2019	link
Hungary	National Assembly (Országgyülés)	386 (1998-2014); 199 (2014-)	Mixed-member proportional representation; 1998-2010: 176 MPs elected in single-member constituencies; 210 MPs elected on territorial and national lists; 2014-2022: 106 MPs elected in single-member constituencies by plurality; 93 MPs elected on party lists	Single-member constituencies and territorial lists are contained within NUTS-2 regions	1998; 2002; 2006; 2010; 2014; 2018; 2022	link; CLEA
Ireland	Lower Chamber (Dáil Éireann)	166 (2002-2016); 158 (2016-2020); 160 (2020-)	Single-transferable voting	Most constituencies are contained within NUTS-2 regions with the exception of Longford-Roscommon (IE04 and IE06)	2002; 2007; 2011; 2016; 2020	link; CLEA
Ireland	Upper Chamber (Seanad Éireann)	60	Single-transferable voting; not directly elected	–	Not collected	–
Italy	Senate (Senato)	315 (2001-2006); 307 (2006-2018); 315 (2018-2022); 200 (2022-)	2001-2006, 2018 - : Mixed member proportional representation: 232 (116 between 2018 and 2022, 74 since 2022) seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats are allocated to minority parties by a proportional method between 2001 and 2006; between 2018 and 2022, the remaining seats are elected in 37 (30 since 2022) multi-member constituencies; 2006-2018: Closed-list proportional representation, 1 seat by first-past-the-post voting in Aosta Valley	2001-2006: 232 single-member constituencies; 2006-2018: 22 multiple-member constituencies, 7 single-member constituencies; 2018-2022: 116 single-member constituencies, 37 multi-member constituencies; 2022 - 74 single-member constituencies; 30 multi-member constituencies; all constituencies are contained within a unique NUTS-2 region	2001; 2006; 2008; 2013; 2018; 2022	link
Italy	Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei deputati)	630 (2001-2006); 617 (2006-2018); 630 (2018-2022); 400 (2022-)	2001-2006, 2018 - : Mixed member proportional representation: 475 (232 between 2018 and 2022, 147 since 2022) seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats are elected in 26 (67 between 2018 and 2022, 53 since 2022) multi-member constituencies; 2006-2018: Closed-list proportional representation, 1 seat by first-past-the-post voting in Aosta Valley, 12 seas by open-list proportional representation for Italians living abroad	2001-2006: 475 single-member constituencies, 26 multiple-member constituencies; 2006-2018: 30 multiple-member constituencies, 1 single-member constituency; 2018-2022: 232 single-member constituencies, 67 multi-member constituencies; 2022 - 147 single-member constituencies; 53 multi-member constituencies	2001; 2006; 2008; 2013; 2018; 2022; all constituencies are contained within a unique NUTS-2 region	link1; link2
Latvia	Parliament (Saeima)	100	Open-list proportional representation	5 constituencies	Not collected	–
Lithuania	Parliament (Seimas)	141	Mixed member proportional representation: 71 seats are elected in single-member constituencies; 70 seats are elected at the national level by open-list proportional representation	71 electoral districts; their boundaries may not overall with NUTS-2 regions	2000; 2004; 2008; 2012; 2016; 2020	CLEA
Luxembourg	Chamber of Deputies	60	Open-list proportional representation	4 constituencies	Not collected	–
Malta	Parliament (Il-Parlament ta' Malta)	65+	Single-transferable voting; additional seats may be allocated to achieve proportional representation	13 electoral districts	Not collected	–
Netherlands	House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal)	150	Open-list proportional representation	Unique constituency	Not collected	–
Netherlands	Senate (Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal)	75	Elected by the members of the States-Provincial and electoral colleges in the Caribbean Netherlands by proportional representation	Unique constituency	Not collected	–
Poland	Lower Chamber (Sejm)	460	Open-list proportional representation	41 electoral constituencies, contained within NUTS-2 regions	2001; 2005; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019	link; CLEA
Poland	Upper Chamber (Senate)	100	2001-2011: plurality bloc voting – two or more candidates with the highest support are elected from each constituency; 2011 - : senators are elected in single-member constituencies by first-past-the-post voting	2001-2011: 36 multi-member constituencies; 2011 - : 100 single-member constituencies; all constituencies are contained within a unique NUTS-2 region	2001; 2005; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019	link; CLEA

National parliaments (cont.)

Country	Chamber	# seats	Electoral rule	Constituencies	Election years	Source
Portugal	Assembly of the Republic (Assembleia da República)	230	Closed list proportional representation	22 electoral districts; some electoral districts spread over several NUTS-2 regions: Aveiro (PT11 and PT16), Guarda (PT11 and PT16), Lisboa (PT16, PT17, and PT18), Santarem (PT16 and PT18), Setubal (PT17 and PT19), Viseu (PT11 and PT16)	2005, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2022	link
Romania	Chamber of Deputies (Camera Deputaților)	345 (2000-2004); 332 (2004-2008); 334 (2008-2012); 412 (2012-2016); 329 (2016-)	2000-2008, 2016-2020: Closed-list proportional representation; 2008-2016: Mixed member proportional representation (a candidate wins a seat in his constituency is (s)he won more than 50% of votes; non-allocated seats are allocated using the d'Hondt system); additional seats may be added	2002-2008: 42 multi-member constituencies; 2008-2012: 315 single-member constituencies; 2012-2016: 316 single-member constituencies; 2016 - : 43 multi-member constituencies	2000; 2004; 2008; 2012; 2016; 2020	link1; link2; link3; link4; CLEA
Romania	Senate (Senat)	140 (2000-2004); 137 (2004-2012); 176 (2012-)	2000-2008, 2016-2020: Closed-list proportional representation; 2008-2016: Mixed member proportional representation (a candidate wins a seat in his constituency is (s)he won more than 50% of votes; non-allocated seats are allocated using the d'Hondt system); additional seats may be added	2002-2008: 42 multi-member constituencies; 2008-2012: 315 single-member constituencies; 2012-2016: 137 single-member constituencies; 2016 - : 43 multi-member constituencies	2000; 2004; 2008; 2012; 2016; 2020	link1; link2; link3; link4; CLEA
Slovakia	National Council (Národná rada Slovenskej republiky)	150	Open-list proportional representation	Unique constituency	Not collected	–
Slovenia	National Assembly (Državni zbor Republike Slovenije)	90	Open-list proportional representation	11 constituencies, that may not overlap with NUTS-2 boundaries	Not collected	–
Slovenia	National Council (Državni svet)	40	Indirectly elected by local council and functional constituencies	–	Not collected	–
Spain	Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados)	350	Closed-list proportional representation	52 constituencies that are contained within NUTS2 regions	2000; 2004; 2008; 2011; 2015; 2016; 2019 (Apr); 2019 (Nov)	link1; link2; link3
Spain	Senate (Senado)	266	208 senators directly elected by closed-list proportional representation; 58 additional senators designated by regional legislatures	52 constituencies that are contained within NUTS2 regions	2000; 2004; 2008; 2011; 2015; 2016; 2019 (Apr); 2019 (Nov)	link1; link2; link3
Sweden	Riksdag	349	310 MPs are elected through open-list proportional representation on multi-member party lists that are either regional or national; remaining seats are elected by proportional balancing	29 constituencies that are contained within NUTS-2 regions	2002; 2006; 2010; 2014; 2018; 2022	link
United Kingdom	House of Commons	659 (1997-2001); 646 (2005); 650 (2010-2019)	First-past-the-post voting method	Constituencies may spread across several NUTS-2 regions	1997; 2001; 2005; 2010; 2015; 2017; 2019	CLEA
United Kingdom	House of Lords	Varies	Spiritual and Temporal Lords, not directly elected	None	Not collected	–

Notes: We also collect data on substitutes.

Regional parliaments in Belgium

Region	# seats	Electoral rule	Constituencies	Election years	Source
Brussels	75 (1999-2004); 89 (2004-)	Open-list proportional voting	Single constituency	1999; 2004; 2009; 2014; 2019	link
Flanders	124	Open-list proportional voting	12 constituencies (1999-2004); 6 constituencies (2004-)	1999; 2004; 2009; 2014; 2019	link
German-speaking region	25	Open list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2004; 2009; 2014; 2019	link
Wallonia	75	Open-list proportional voting	13 constituencies (1999-2019); 11 constituencies (2019-)	1999; 2004; 2009; 2014; 2019	link

Notes: We also collect data on substitutes.

Regional parliaments in Germany

Region	# seats	Electoral rule	Constituencies	Election years	Source
Baden-Württemberg (DE1)	120+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 70 seats in single-member constituencies; 50 seats by proportional representation; additional leveling and overhang seats	70 constituencies	1996; 2001; 2006; 2011; 2016; 2021	link
Bavaria (DE2)	204 (1998-2003); 180+ (2003-)	Mixed-member proportional representation: 91 (102 in 1998, 92 in 2003) seats in single-member electoral districts; remaining seats using open lists in seven constituencies; additional leveling and overhang seats	91 (102 in 1998, 92 in 2003) electoral districts; 7 constituencies	1998; 2003; 2008; 2013; 2018	link
Berlin (DE3)	130+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 78 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using regional or state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	78 electoral districts; 12 (23 in 1999) regional lists	1999; 2001; 2006; 2011; 2016; 2021	link
Brandenburg (DE4)	89 (1999-2004); 88 (2004-)	Mixed-member proportional representation: 44 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists	44 electoral districts	1999; 2004; 2009; 2014; 2019	link
Bremen (DE5)	83	Open-list proportional representation	2 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019	link
Hamburg (DE6)	121+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 71 seats in multi-member constituencies via open lists; 50 additional seats elected at the state level via open lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	17 electoral districts	1997; 2001; 2004; 2008; 2011; 2015; 2020	link
Hesse (DE7)	110+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 55 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats at the state level via closed lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	55 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2008; 2009; 2013; 2018	link
Lower Saxony (DE8)	135+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 87 (100 before 2008) seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	100 constituencies (1998-2008); 87 constituencies (2008-)	1998; 2003; 2008; 2013; 2017; 2022	link
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (DE9)	71+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 36 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	36 constituencies	1998; 2002; 2006; 2011; 2016; 2021	link
North Rhine-Westphalia (DEA)	181+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 128 (151 before 2005) seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	151 constituencies (2000-2005); 128 constituencies (2005-)	2000; 2005; 2010; 2012; 2017; 2022	link
Rhineland-Palatinate (DEB)	101+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 52 (51 before 2021) seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	51 constituencies (1996-2021); 52 constituencies (2021-)	1996; 2001; 2006; 2011; 2016; 2021	link
Saarland (DEC)	51	Proportional representation	3 constituencies	1999; 2004; 2009; 2012; 2017; 2022	link
Saxony (DED)	120+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 60 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	60 constituencies	1999; 2004; 2009; 2014; 2019	link
Saxony-Anhalt (DEE)	83+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 41-49 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	49 constituencies (1998-2006); 45 constituencies (2006-2016); 43 constituencies (2016-2021); 41 constituencies (2021-)	1998; 2002; 2006; 2011; 2016; 2021	link
Schleswig-Holstein (DEF)	69+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 35 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	45 constituencies (1996-2005); 40 constituencies (2005-2012); 35 constituencies (2012-)	1996; 2000; 2005; 2009; 2012; 2017; 2022	link
Thuringia (DEG)	88+	Mixed-member proportional representation: 44 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using state lists; additional leveling and overhang seats	44 constituencies	1999; 2004; 2009; 2014; 2019	link

Notes: We also collect data on substitutes.

Regional parliaments in Spain

Region	# seats	Electoral rule	Constituencies	Election years	Source
Andalusia (ES61)	109	Closed-list proportional representation	8 constituencies	2000; 2004; 2008; 2012; 2015; 2018; 2022	link
Aragon (ES24)	67	Closed-list proportional representation	3 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Asturias (ES12)	45	Closed-list proportional representation	3 electoral districts	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2012; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Balearic Islands (ES53)	59	Closed-list proportional representation	4 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Basque Country (ES21)	75	Closed-list proportional representation	3 constituencies	1998; 2001; 2005; 2009; 2012; 2016; 2020	link
Canary Islands (ES70)	60 (1999-2019); 70 (2019-)	Closed-list proportional representation	8 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Cantabria (ES13)	39 (1999-2015) 35 (2015-)	Closed-list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Castile–La Mancha (ES42)	47 (1999-2011); 49 (2011-2015); 33 (2015-)	Closed-list proportional representation	5 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Castile and Leon (ES41)	83 (1999-2003); 82 (2003-2007); 84 (2007-2019); 81 (2019-)	Closed-list proportional representation	9 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2022	link
Catalonia (ES51)	135	Closed-list proportional representation	4 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2006; 2010; 2012; 2015; 2017; 2021	link
Extremadura (ES43)	65	Closed-list proportional representation	3 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Galicia (ES11)	75	Closed-list proportional representation	4 constituencies	1997; 2001; 2005; 2009; 2012; 2016; 2020	link
La Rioja (ES23)	33	Closed-list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Madrid (ES30)	102 (1999-2003); 111 (2003-2007); 120 (2007-2011); 129 (2011-2019); 132 (2019-2021); 136 (2021-2023); 135 (2023-)	Closed-list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2021; 2023	link
Region of Murcia (ES62)	45	Closed-list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	NA
Navarre (ES22)	50	Closed-list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	NA
Valencian Community (ES52)	89 (1999-2007); 99 (2007-)	Closed-list proportional representation	3 constituencies	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	link
Ceuta (ES63)	25	Closed-list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	NA
Melilla (ES64)	25	Closed-list proportional representation	Single constituency	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2019; 2023	NA

Notes: PDFs with the results in each region are also available at this link. Whenever possible, we also collect data on substitutes, except for the following regions: Navarre, Ceuta, and Melilla.

Regional parliaments in the United Kingdom

Region	# seats	Electoral rule	Constituencies	Election years	Source
Northern Ireland	108 (1998-2017); 90 (2017-)	Single transferable vote	18 constituencies	1998; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2016; 2017; 2022	link
Scotland	129	Mixed-member proportional representation: 73 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using regional lists	73 constituencies and 8 regions	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2016; 2021	link
Wales	60	Mixed-member proportional representation: 40 seats in single-member constituencies; remaining seats by proportional representation using regional lists	40 constituencies and 5 regions	1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2016; 2021	link

Notes: We also collect data on substitutes.

Table A-2
MEPs' birthplace and political attachment

Country	# MEPs	Birthplace available	Candidate national parliament	Elected national parliament	Elected regional parliament
Austria	43	42 (97.67%)	30 (69.77%)	13 (30.23%)	– –
Belgium	46	44 (95.65%)	31 (67.39%)	13 (28.26%)	23 (50.00%)
Bulgaria	41	38 (92.68%)	30 (73.17%)	22 (53.66%)	– –
Croatia	20	15 (75.00%)	10 (50.00%)	9 (45.00%)	– –
Cyprus	15	– –	– –	– –	– –
Czech Republic	48	46 (95.83%)	32 (66.67%)	19 (39.58%)	– –
Denmark	29	29 (100%)	20 (68.97%)	15 (51.72%)	– –
Estonia	16	– –	– –	– –	– –
Finland	33	33 (100%)	32 (96.97%)	27 (81.82%)	– –
France	173	155 (89.60%)	95 (54.91%)	27 (15.61%)	– –
Germany	184	176 (95.65%)	66 (35.87%)	19 (10.33%)	54 (29.35%)
Greece	56	48 (85.71%)	22 (39.29%)	14 (25.00%)	– –
Hungary	42	35 (83.33%)	33 (78.57%)	18 (42.86%)	– –
Ireland	26	24 (92.31%)	19 (73.08%)	15 (57.69%)	– –
Italy	173	168 (97.11%)	93 (53.76%)	49 (28.32%)	– –
Latvia	17	– –	– –	– –	– –
Lithuania	24	21 (87.50%)	21 (87.50%)	13 (54.17%)	– –
Luxembourg	13	– –	– –	– –	– –
Malta	13	– –	– –	– –	– –
Netherlands	56	52 (92.86%)	– –	– –	– –
Poland	114	111 (97.37%)	96 (84.21%)	85 (74.56%)	– –
Portugal	50	40 (80.00%)	27 (54.00%)	18 (36.00%)	– –
Romania	68	67 (98.53%)	44 (64.71%)	33 (48.53%)	– –
Slovakia	29	28 (96.55%)	– –	– –	– –
Slovenia	17	– –	– –	– –	– –
Spain	133	122 (91.73%)	65 (48.87%)	39 (29.32%)	61 (45.86%)
Sweden	50	44 (88.00%)	37 (74.00%)	24 (48.00%)	– –
United Kingdom	117	106 (90.60%)	68 (58.12%)	6 (5.13%)	10 (8.55%)
Total	1,646	1,444 (87.72%)	871 (52.91%)	478 (29.04%)	549 (33.35%)

Notes: We drop from the final sample MEPs who did not vote on any trade agreements during the period (2 MEPs), MEPs who were elected in different countries during their tenure in the EP (2 MEPs), and MEPs who were only elected in the French Overseas constituency (4 MEPs). In identifying the region of birth, we discard MEPs who were born in a different country than the one where they were elected in the EP (103 MEPs), MEPs born in regions for which we lack data on covariates (11 MEPs), MEPs born in the French Overseas constituencies (2 MEPs), and MEPs from countries that are not divided into several NUTS-2 regions, including Slovenia (86 MEPs). In identifying the region where MEPs ran and/or were elected to national parliaments, we do not consider countries that are not divided into several NUTS-2 regions, including Slovenia. We further discard the Netherlands and Slovakia as their national parliaments have a single national constituency. We also drop MEPs who ran or were elected in regions for which we lack data on covariates.

Table A-3
Elections to the European Parliament

Country	Constituencies	Electoral system	Allocation method	Threshold	Source
Austria	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	5%	link
Belgium	Three sub-national constituencies	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Bulgaria	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	Hare quota method	None	link
Croatia	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	5%	link
Cyprus	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	Hare quota method	1.8%	link
Czech Republic	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	5%	link
Denmark	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Estonia	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Finland	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
France	Eight sub-national constituencies (2009-19); Single constituency (2019-)	Closed-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	5%	link
Germany	Single constituency	Closed-list proportional representation	Sainte-Haguë method	5%	link
Greece	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	Hare quota method	3%	link
Hungary	Single constituency	Closed-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	5%	link
Ireland	Two sub-national constituencies (2009-14); Three sub-national constituencies (2014-)	Single-transferable voting	Droop quota, random apportionment	None	link
Italy	Five sub-national constituencies	Open-list proportional representation	Hare quota method	4%	link
Latvia	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	Sainte-Haguë method	4%	link
Lithuania	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	Hare quota	5%	link
Luxembourg	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Malta	Single constituency	Single-transferable voting	Droop quota, random apportionment	None	link
Netherlands	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Poland	Thirteen sub-national constituencies	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	5%	link
Portugal	Single constituency	Closed-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Romania	Single constituency	Closed-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	5%	link
Slovakia	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	Droop quota method	5%	link
Slovenia	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Spain	Single constituency	Closed-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link
Sweden	Single constituency	Open-list proportional representation	Scandinavian method	4%	link
United Kingdom	Twelve sub-national constituencies	Closed-list proportional representation	D'Hondt method	None	link

Table A-4
Eurostat datasets

Dataset	Variables	Sample	Notes	Source
Population by educational attainment level, sex and NUTS 2 regions (%)	% Population with tertiary education	Both genders, age 25-64	Missing values for the UK in 2020	link
Employment by sex, age, economic activity and NUTS 2 regions (NACE Rev. 2)	Employment levels in aggregate sectors	Both genders, age 15-74, 10 industry groups	394 missing values	link
SBS data by NUTS 2 regions and NACE Rev. 2	Persons employed in two-digit sectors	67 two-digit industries	13,388 missing values out of 72,628	link
Unemployment rates by sex, age, educational attainment level and NUTS 2 regions (%)	Unemployment rate	All educational levels, both genders, age 15-74	15 missing values	link
Number of households by degree of urbanisation and NUTS 2 regions (1 000)	Urbanization rate	Degrees of urbanization: cities, towns and suburbs, rural areas	15 missing values	link
Eurobarometer	Favorable opinion on trade	Eurobarometer surveys 65.2, 67.2, 72.4, 82.3, 84.3, 85.2, 86.2, 87.2, 88.3, 89.1, 90.3, 91.5;	Classify "very positive" and "positive" images of trade as favorable opinions. Nuts regions not included: EL41, EL42, EL62, ES63, ES64, FI20, FRM0, FRY1-FRY5, PT20, PT30.	link
Eurobarometer	Trust in political parties	Eurobarometer surveys 65.2, 66.1, 66.3, 68.1, 69.2, 70.1, 71.3, 72.4, 73.4, 74.2, 76.3, 77.3, 78.1, 79.3, 80.1, 81.2, 81.4, 82.3, 83.3, 84.3, 85.2, 86.2, 87.3, 88.3, 89.1, 90.3, 91.2, 91.5, 92.3, 93.1	NUTS regions not included: EL41, EL42, EL62, ES63, ES64, FI20, FRM0, FRY1-FRY5, PT20, PT30.	link
Eurobarometer	Trust in the EU	Eurobarometer surveys 65.2, 66.1, 67.2, 68.1, 69.2, 70.1, 71.1, 71.3, 72.4, 73.4, 74.2, 75.3, 76.3, 77.3, 78.1, 79.3, 80.1, 81.2, 81.4, 82.3, 83.1, 83.3, 84.3, 85.2, 86.2, 87.2, 87.3, 88.3, 89.1, 90.3, 91.2, 91.5, 92.3, 93.1	NUTS regions not included: EL41, EL42, EL62, ES63, ES64, FI20, FRM0, FRY1-FRY5, PT20, PT30.	link
Eurobarometer	Ideological positioning on a left-right scale	Eurobarometer surveys 65.1, 65.2, 66.1, 66.3, 67.2, 68.1, 69.2, 70.1, 71.1, 71.3, 72.4, 73.4, 74.2, 75.3, 78.2, 79.5, 81.2, 81.4, 82.3, 83.1, 83.3, 84.3, 85.2, 86.2, 87.1, 87.2, 87.3, 88.3, 89.1, 90.3, 91.2, 91.5, 92.2, 92.3, 93.1, 94.2	NUTS regions not included: EL41, EL42, EL62, ES63, ES64, FI20, FRM0, FRY1-FRY5, PT20, PT30.	link

Table A-5
Matching service sectors in EBOPS2010 to NACE Rev. 2

EBOPS2010 codes	**EBOPS2010 description**	**NACE Rev. 2 codes**	**NACE Rev. 2 description**
SC	Transport	H49	Land transport and transport via pipelines
SC	Transport	H50	Water transport
SC	Transport	H51	Air transport
SC	Transport	H52	Warehousing and support activities for transportation
SC	Transport	H53	Postal and courier activities
SD	Travel	I55	Accommodation
SD	Travel	I56	Food and beverage service activities
SE	Construction	F41	Construction of buildings
SE	Construction	F42	Civil engineering
SE	Construction	F43	Specialised construction activities
SF	Insurance and pension services	K	Financial and Insurance Activities
SG	Financial services	K	Financial and Insurance Activities
SI	Telecommunications, computer, and information services	J58	Publishing activities
SI	Telecommunications, computer, and information services	J59	Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities
SI	Telecommunications, computer, and information services	J60	Programming and broadcasting activities
SI	Telecommunications, computer, and information services	J61	Telecommunications
SI	Telecommunications, computer, and information services	J62	Computer programming, consultancy and related activities
SI	Telecommunications, computer, and information services	J63	Information service activities

A-4 Descriptive statistics

Table A-6
MEP-level variables

	N	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
$Vote_{i,a(t)}$	9,284	0.76	0.43	0.00	1.00
$Female_i$	1,646	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
$Age_{i,t}$	9,851	53.55	10.90	21.97	92.31
$Tenure_{i,t}$	9,851	6.09	5.57	0.00	38.70
Candidate for National Parliament$_{i,t}$	9,851	0.46	0.50	0	1
Seat in National Parliament$_{i,t}$	9,851	0.23	0.42	0	1
Seat in National or Regional Parliament$_{i,t}$	9,851	0.28	0.45	0	1

Table A-7
EU constituency-level variables

	N	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Export Ratio$_{c,t}$	549	0.95	1.05	0.01	7.82
Export Ratio$_{c,t}$ (with services)	549	1.39	0.99	0.22	5.56
Pro-Trade Opinions$_{c,t}$	549	81.60	8.84	51.60	100.00
Tertiary Education$_c$	66	24.96	7.76	11.70	41.60
Unemployed$_c$	66	6.65	1.99	3.40	13.30
Urban$_c$	66	68.45	21.90	10.40	99.90
Left-Right Index$_c$	66	5.44	0.51	4.39	6.51
Trust in Political Parties$_c$	66	17.82	11.17	2.50	54.00
Trust in EU$_c$	66	56.40	15.56	20.30	78.60

A-5 Additional results and robustness checks

Table A-8

US legislators' trade votes and trade interests of their constituency

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Export Ratio$_{c,t}$	-0.020	-0.006	0.004	0.089**
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.040)
Legislators controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,331	1,331	1,331	1,254
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.764	0.764	0.764	0.750

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if US senator i (elected in constituency (i.e., state) c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of the legislator's state. The legislator controls include gender, age, and tenure of the member of congress. The constituency controls in the data of Conconi *et al.* (2014) include the following variables (contemporaneous to the vote): size of the constituency in terms of population, and share of high skilled population (education level at a bachelor degree or above). Robust standard errors, clustered at the legislator level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-9

MEP's votes and trade interests of their constituencies
(including MEP fixed effects, linear probability model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.023***	0.033***	0.047***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Socio-economic controls	No	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
MEP FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,867	8,867	8,867
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS
R-squared	0.717	0.722	0.725

Notes: This table reports the coefficients of the export ratio estimated using a linear probability modedel. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an MEP voted in favor of a free trade agreement and 0 if (s)he voted against it. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-10
First stage IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$^{IV}_{c,t-1}$	2.095***	2.097***	2.276***	2.319***	1.600***
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.026)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: This table reports the first step of the IV logit specification. The dependent variable is *Export Ratio* $IV_{c(k(g)),t}$, as defined in equation (6). The legislator controls include gender, age, and tenure of the MEP. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-11

MEPs' trade votes and trade interests of their constituency (linear probability model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.006***	0.005***	0.007***	0.008***	0.028***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
R-squared	0.602	0.602	0.612	0.618	0.631

Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the export ratio estimated using a linear probability model. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The legislator controls include gender, age, and tenure of the MEP. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-12

MEP's votes and trade interests of their constituencies (2SLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.013***	0.012***	0.009***	0.009***	0.023***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284
Estimation method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
KP F-statistic	883.8	918.7	1653.9	2044.2	3671.9

Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the export ratio estimated using a two-stage-least-squares model. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-13

MEPs' trade votes and trade interests of their constituency (including services)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.020***	0.020***	0.021***	0.017***	0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.749	0.749	0.748	0.749	0.747

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-14

MEPs' trade votes and trade opinions of their constituency

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pro-Trade Opinions$_{c,t-1}$	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.003***	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.749	0.749	0.749	0.750	0.747

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Pro-Trade Opinions*$_{c,t-1}$ captures pro-trade opinions of EU citizens in the most recent Eurobarometer survey and is constructed at the country level. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-15

MEPs' trade votes and trade interests of their national party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.004***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.749	0.749	0.748	0.749	0.746

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-16

MEPs' trade votes and trade interests of their constituency
(controlling for MEPs' domestic political career)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.007***	0.021***	0.007***	0.020***	0.006***	0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Candidate for National Parliament$_{i,t-1}$	0.005	0.000				
	(0.008)	(0.006)				
Seat in National Parliament$_{i,t-1}$			0.029***	0.021***		
			(0.008)	(0.007)		
Seat in National or Regional Parliament$_{i,t-1}$					0.026***	0.014**
					(0.010)	(0.007)
MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	9,284	9,177	9,284	9,177	9,284	9,177
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.749	0.747	0.749	0.747	0.749	0.747

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. *Candidate for National Parliament*$_{i,t-1}$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if MEP i ran for a seat in the national parliament before the vote. *Seat in National Parliament*$_{i,t-1}$ (*Seat in National or Regional Parliament*$_{i,t-1}$) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if MEP i won a seat in the national (national or regional) parliament before the vote. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-17

MEPs' trade votes and trade interests of their constituency (abstentions as negative votes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***	0.036***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.012)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,851	9,851	9,851	9,851	9,812
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.719	0.719	0.719	0.719	0.718

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means. The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-18

MEPs' trade votes and trade interests of their constituency (abstentions as positive votes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.018***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Legislator controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agreement FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,851	9,851	9,851	9,851	9,742
Estimation method	logit	logit	logit	logit	logit
Pred. probability	0.776	0.776	0.776	0.776	0.774

Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the export ratio estimated using a logit model and evaluated at sample means.The dependent variable is the indicator variable $Vote_{i(c,p),a(t)}$, which is equal to 1 if legislator i (elected constituency c, and belonging to party p), votes in favor of agreement a in year t, and 0 if (s)he votes against it. The variable *Export Ratio*$_{c,t-1}$ defined in equation (3) captures the trade policy interest of constituency c the year before the vote. The socioeconomic controls include the share of people with tertiary education, the unemployment rate, and the urbanization rate, measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. The political controls include the ideological positioning of the constituents and trust levels in political parties and the EU, all measured in 2008 and interacted with year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MEP level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.

Table A-19

Export ratio and share of votes for pro-trade parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Export Ratio$_{c,t-1}$	0.020*	0.051**	0.020**	0.043**
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.018)
R-squared	0.037	0.693	0.069	0.730
EP Term FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constituency FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	174	172	174	172
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating (7). In columns 1-2 (3-4), the variable *Share of Votes for Pro-Trade Parties*$_{c,t}$ is constructed using a binary (continuous) version of the variable *Pro-Trade*$_p$. Robust standard errors, clustered at the constituency level, are reported in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.